



basic education

Department:
Basic Education
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE

GRADE 12

HISTORY P2

FEBRUARY/MARCH 2013

ADDENDUM

This addendum consists of 15 pages.



QUESTION 1: WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR ON SOUTH AFRICA?**SOURCE 1A**

The source outlines the factors that 'forced' the National Party government to the negotiating table with the African National Congress.

Two factors were helpful to De Klerk in pushing for inclusive negotiations. First, South Africa had succeeded in extricating (removing) itself from the Namibian imbroglio (embarrassing situation) with considerable assistance from the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations. The protracted negotiating process culminated in general elections in 1989 and independence in March 1990. Although difficult, Namibia's transition had eventually proved smoother than anyone had dared to hope. It was perhaps a dress rehearsal for what could possibly be achieved in South Africa, as well as being a sign that under Gorbachev foreign adventures by the Soviets would be stopped, and that a negotiated settlement should be sought in Namibia, South Africa and elsewhere by political rather than violent means ...

The second factor was the steady unravelling (collapse) of the Soviet Union and the roll-back of its domination over much of Eastern Europe, which was symbolised by the destruction of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. The collapse of communism destroyed whatever credibility the total-onslaught doctrine retained [had], as well as reducing fears that the South African Communist Party would remain as a kind of ideological Trojan Horse (device used to bring about an enemy's downfall) within the African National Congress ...

[From: *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* by D Welsh]

SOURCE 1B

This source focuses on FW de Klerk's reaction to the fall of communism.

The first few months of my presidency coincided with the disintegration (collapse) of communism in Eastern Europe which reached its historic climax with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Within the scope of a few months, one of our main strategic concerns for decades – the Soviet Union's role in southern Africa and its strong influence on the African National Congress and South African Communist Party, had all but disappeared. A window had suddenly opened which created an opportunity for a much more adventurous approach than had previously been conceived.

The cabinet needed to take stock of the situation. Although we had started to create a climate for negotiations, our actions were still piecemeal (slow). We needed a comprehensive negotiation strategy. I initiated a process of deep analysis which culminated (ended) in a bosberaad (meeting where important decisions are taken) between the 3rd and 5th of December.

We began by asking ourselves how we could promote negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation. We agreed on the importance of seizing the initiative and of occupying the moral high ground ... From all of this, we began to develop a clearer picture of how we wanted to make concrete our core vision for a united South Africa where everybody would have equal rights and opportunities and within which our many minorities would not be threatened or suppressed ...

At the end of our December bosberaad the whole cabinet (even its most conservative members) were ready for the quantum (big) leap I had promised them when I became leader in February 1989. They accepted the full logical consequences that power-sharing provided and that there would be reasonable protection for minority rights and agreed that the ANC would have to be part of the process.

[From: *The Last Trek – A New Beginning* by FW de Klerk]

SOURCE 1C

This source consists of a written and a visual source on the impact of De Klerk's 1990 speech.

Written Source: The reaction of the ANC to FW de Klerk's 2 February 1990 speech.

His announcements took the exiled ANC completely by surprise: unbanning the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress and the South African Communist Party; undertaking to free Mandela soon; releasing scores of political prisoners, lifting media restrictions and declaring his government's commitment to creating a 'totally new and just dispensation' based on equality.

It was so unexpected, even out of character. De Klerk saying the 'agenda is open' and the 'overall aims' included 'a new, democratic constitution' and 'universal franchise' seemed convincing enough, with most in Lusaka and elsewhere seeing it as a genuine opportunity for open politics, but others at first suspected it might be a ruse (trick). Their reaction reflected the decades of suspicion and mistrust born of the Nationalists' long indifferences towards the black majority.

Perhaps the most optimistic (positive) voice was that of Thabo Mbeki. 'If Mr De Klerk says the time for talking has come,' the ANC's foreign secretary said from Stockholm, 'we may be saying the same thing ourselves.'

[From: *Apartheid An Illustrated History* by M Morris]

Visual Source on next page.



Visual Source: A photograph showing a black South African's reaction to the unbanning of the African National Congress in February 1990.



[From: *One Law, One Nation: The Making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal, et al]

QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR IN 1989 INFLUENCE ANGOLA TO RE-IMAGINE ITSELF?**SOURCE 2A**

This source comprises a written source and a visual source which focus on the first peace agreement that various Angolan political organisations signed in Bicesse on 31 May 1991.

Written Source: This extract describes the Angolan peace process that unfolded in Bicesse, 1991.

Following independence and throughout the 1980s, Angola became a pawn (tool) in the Cold War. The Soviet Union provided loans, military advisers and weapons to support the MPLA government in Luanda. The Cubans sent troops numbering, at their height, fifty thousand. South African forces crossed Angola's borders periodically to attack SWAPO bases in Angola ... Real progress in resolving the Angolan conflict came in 1990. At that time Portugal, assisted by the United States and the Soviet Union, participated in a new round of talks with the MPLA and UNITA in Bicesse, Portugal. Motivating the negotiations were the simple but critical facts that neither side could foresee military victory and that their traditional patrons (followers) were now determined to push for a political settlement.

The negotiations were difficult but ultimately successful. In May 1991, UNITA and the MPLA signed the *Arcordos de Paz para Angola* or the Bicesse Accord. A cease-fire took effect two weeks later. In addition to the cease-fire, the peace agreement called for the integration of the two armies into a single national army and the holding of internationally monitored elections between September and November 1992. The military forces were to be integrated before the elections. The accord also established what was known as the 'triple zero' clause, under which the United States, the Soviet Union and Portugal agreed not to provide the combatants with lethal material and promised to encourage others to follow suit.

[From: *Angola's Last Best Chance For Peace: An Insider's Account Of The Peace Process* by P Hare]

Visual Source on the next page.

Visual Source: This photograph was taken after the Bicesse Peace Agreement was signed in 1991. It depicts Jonas Savimbi in Jamba with Jeremias Chitunde, vice president of UNITA and Miguel Nzau Puna.



Jeremias Chitunde

Jonas Savimbi

Miguel Nzau Puna

[From: <http://www.mbokamosika.com/article-il-y-a-10-ans-mourait-jonas-malheiro-savimbi-100064854.html>.
Accessed on 10 April 2012]

SOURCE 2B

This extract describes how Eduardo Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi exploited their positions in Angola after the Bicesse Peace Accord in 1991.

Extract 1: This extract focuses on how Dos Santos used his position to enrich his family and friends.

Throughout the rollercoaster (up and down) years of war and peace, Dos Santos and his entourage (followers) prospered greatly. From his headquarters at Futungo de Belas, Dos Santos ran a presidential patronage (support) system that rewarded his family, friends and colleagues, and the futungos (elite families) with government contracts, business opportunities, diamond concessions, land titles, import licenses, trade monopolies and cheap credit. Arms purchases for the war provided a favoured few with large kickbacks (refunds). The government's privatisation programme enabled high-ranking army officers and senior officials to acquire state-owned properties, farms and businesses for nominal sums or sometimes for no payment at all ...

The stark (sharp) contrast between the rich elite and the mass poverty of the rest of the population was nowhere more evident than in Luanda. Its streets were packed with the latest models of Mercedes-Benz and Toyota Land Cruisers; jet skis circled the bay; prices in air-conditioned shopping malls were equivalent to those in London. But milling around on street corners were groups of street children and *mutilados* (injured people) begging from the passing traffic. Half of the city's population of 4 million had no access to clean water and survived on untreated water from the Bengo River bought by the bucketful from informal vendors. Most Angolans subsisted (survived) on less than seventy cents a day.

[From: *The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence* by M Meredith]


Extract 2: This extract gives an account of how resources were exploited by Savimbi during Angola's civil war.

UNITA's control of such backyard diamond diggings across the country had doubtless contributed its share to Savimbi's coffers ... It was above all by capturing diamond fields in these two provinces that UNITA had managed to keep funding a war after 1992 ... By the 1990s, there was no question of the Angolan war being about ideology or about anybody's freedom. It was about money. Analysts have used the term 'resource war' to describe this very contemporary kind of conflict ... Colonial officials were free to grab what they wanted from the earth or from the people of the conquered territory, provided that they rendered a predetermined tax to the Portuguese crown each year. Wartime Angola echoed the colonial past. The FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) generals who won back territory from UNITA could do more or less what they liked with it, as long as enough of a cut went back to Luanda. When it suited them, government and UNITA generals would trade with each other.

[From: *An Outbreak of Peace: Angola's Situation of Confusion* by J Pearce]

SOURCE 2C

This Portuguese cartoon has been translated into English. It comments on corruption that occurred during the conflict in Angola. It appeared in *Actual*, 1 June 2000.



[From: *The Peaceful Face of Angola: Biography of a Peace Process* by MG Comerford]



QUESTION 3: WHAT OBSTACLES DID SOUTH AFRICA FACE ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY BETWEEN 1990 AND 1994?**SOURCE 3A**

This source refers to Nelson Mandela's attitude after he was released from Victor Verster prison on 11 February 1990.

When asked how different the man who emerged from prison after twenty-seven years was from the one who went in, he replied: 'I came out mature.' Mandela disliked talking about himself. He often felt anger about whites, he said, but not hatred. His hatred was directed at the system. His anger was directed at individuals, never against whites as a group.

No matter what personal hardship he had undergone, he was determined never to lose sight of the goal of non-racial democracy, believing that white fear of it could eventually be overcome.

The example he set was of profound (great) importance. For if after twenty-seven years in prison, Mandela could emerge insisting on reconciliation, it undermined the demands of those seeking revenge and retribution. His generosity of spirit also had a profound impact on his white adversaries (enemies), earning him measures of trust and confidence that laid the foundations for a political settlement.

[From: *The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence* by M Meredith]

SOURCE 3B

This source consists of two views on the process of negotiations between various political role players after 1990.

Viewpoint 1: This is part of an extract by Tertius Delport, a high-ranking member of the National Party. He expressed fears after FW de Klerk delivered his speech on 2 February 1990.

The ANC are going to take our land. They're going to take everything we have worked for. We're going to have no law and order. It won't be safe to walk the streets. The SACP and MK (Umkhonto weSizwe) want an absolute domination in a one-party state and we will have a totally socialist approach to the economy ... the NP desperately has to fight for minority protection so that one group or party cannot grab all the power. We have to ensure a multi-party situation in South Africa.

[From: *One Law, One Nation – The Making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal and S Cort]

Viewpoint 2: These are comments made by Frene Ginwala (1991) wherein she expresses her views on how a 'new' South Africa might unfold. She was a member of the ANC and an aide to OR Tambo.

... all of us were convinced in the many years of liberation struggle that victory was certain. That was one of the favourite slogans. But, there was never a clear cut and unequivocal (plain) scenario of how that victory was going to come about and what would actually happen. A move to a people's war and the possibility of insurrection (revolt) were avidly (eagerly) debated. ... and many a fantasy (dream) was woven of an embattled regime regrouping around the Voortrekker Movement (Monument) behind a laager formed of ox-wagons and Casspirs, tanks, sneeze machines, rocket launchers and so on, while in the cities and countryside ordinary people took over public buildings, factories and the institutions of power. We had visions of MK commanders striding at the head of their troops into Pretoria, Johannesburg and all the cities of South Africa, while people formed spontaneously into a national convention to write the new constitution.

[From: *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* by D Welsh]



SOURCE 3C

This source consists of a written and a visual source on the Bhisho massacre that occurred on 7 September 1992.

Written Source: This extract outlines the events that led to the Bhisho massacre.

In the meantime, the ANC continued its mass action campaign, which culminated in a march on Bhisho, the capital of the independent Ciskei homeland in the Eastern Cape in September 1992. Eighty-thousand people participated in a protest to oust the Ciskei's unpopular military leader, Colonel Oupa Gqozo. But Ciskeian soldiers opened fire on the protesters and 29 people died and over 200 were injured. The media accused ANC leaders of having been 'reckless' in leading the march while also recognising that it was the government's 'surrogates' who were responsible for the deaths of so many people.

Visual Source: This photograph was taken after Ciskeian soldiers opened fire on protestors during a march to a stadium in Bhisho, 7 September 1992.



[From: *One Law, One Nation – The Making of the South African Constitution* by L Segal and S Cort]

QUESTION 4: WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) ON SOUTH AFRICA?**SOURCE 4A**

This extract outlines the reasons for the formation of the TRC.

Mandela believed that, with the exception of Hitler's genocide of the Jews, 'there is no evil which has been so condemned by the world as apartheid'. The ANC had to find a way to forgive without forgetting. Mandela's solution to forgiving without forgetting was to set up in 1995, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Mandela was convinced that the truth had to be told and through that process, with the guilty admitting in public the dreadful wrongs they had done, genuine reconciliation would come. Chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC heard many confessions of appalling crimes, mainly of torture and murder. Most came from the defenders of apartheid but some too from the ANC side.

[From: *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* by M Roberts]

SOURCE 4B

This source explains Desmond Tutu's views on the role of the TRC. He gives examples of the human rights violations that were committed by both the National Party government and liberation movements.

This is a crazy country; if miracles had to happen anywhere, then it's here that they would have to happen. No other country has been prayed for as much as this one. You remember the white woman victim of the APLA attack on the King William's Town golf course. She was so badly injured, her children had to teach her to do things we take for granted. She still can't go through the security check points at airports because she has shrapnel. She said: 'I would like to meet the perpetrator in a spirit of forgiveness. That's wonderful.' She goes on: 'I would like to forgive him,' and then quite incredibly she adds, 'and I hope he will forgive me'. Crazy.

Or the Afrikaner father whose toddler son was killed in the ANC Amanzimtoti Wimpy Bar bomb attack. He said he believed his son had contributed to the coming of the new dispensation. Or the Afrikaner woman in Klerksdorp who testified about the abduction of her husband by liberation army operatives, who spoke about how her grief and loss were just a drop in the ocean in comparison to what other people have suffered in this beautiful traumatised land. Or the daughter of the Cradock Four, after hearing all the gruesome details of how her father had been killed, who said in a hushed East London City Hall, 'We would like to forgive, we just want to know whom to forgive' ... Who couldn't be moved by such exchanges? Who would doubt that a significant contribution was being made to healing, to reconciliation?

[From: *Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* by J Cockrairie, et al]



SOURCE 4C

This cartoon by Zapiro shows Desmond Tutu presenting the final TRC report to President Mbeki in 1998. On the extreme right-hand side of the cartoon De Klerk is seen with officers from the apartheid state's security agency shredding evidence.



[From: *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On* by F du Toit, et al]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

- Cockraine, J. et al. 1999. *Facing the Truth: South African Faith Communities and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (David Phillip, Cape Town)
- Comerford, MG. 2005. *The Peaceful Face of Angola: Biography of a Peace Process (1991 to 2002)* (John Meinert Printing, Windhoek)
- De Klerk, FW. 1998. *A New Beginning* (Human and Rousseau, Cape Town)
- De Klerk, W. 1991. *The Man in his Time – FW de Klerk* (Jonathan Ball, Cape Town)
- Die Burger* (10 February 1990)
- Du Toit, F. et al. 2006. *Truth & Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On* (David Phillip, Cape Town)
- Hare, P. *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account Of The Peace Process* (United States Institute of Peace Process, Washington DC)
- <http://www.mbokamosika.com/article-il-y-a-10-ans-mourait-jona-malheiro-savimbi-100064854.html>
- Meredith, M. 1997. *The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (Free Press, London)
- Morris, M. 2012. *Apartheid An Illustrated History* (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Jeppestown).
- Pearce, J. 2005. *An Outbreak of Peace: Angola's Situation of Confusion* (David Phillip, Cape Town)
- Roberts, M. 1998. *South Africa 1948–94: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Longman, Essex)
- Segal, L & Cort, S. 2011. *One Law, One Nation – The Making of the South African Constitution* (Jacana Media Pty Ltd, Johannesburg)
- Welsh, D. 2009. *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Jonathan Ball Publishers Pty Ltd, Johannesburg)

