



Province of the
EASTERN CAPE
EDUCATION



NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE

GRADE 12

SEPTEMBER 2022

**HISTORY P1
ADDENDUM**

This addendum consists of 14 pages.

QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE ALLIED POWERS RESPOND TO THE SOVIET BLOCKADE OF BERLIN IN 1948?**SOURCE 1A**

The following source describes the economic conditions in Berlin after the Second World War.

Like the rest of Germany, Berlin had suffered enormous damage. Housing space had been seriously reduced. Some 70 percent had been damaged but could still provide shelter. Only 43 percent of the workplaces in Berlin survived. Hospital beds had been reduced from 33 000 to 8 500. None of Berlin's eighty-seven sewer systems functioned, so diseases like typhus and dysentery spread quickly, a situation exacerbated (worsened) by the shortage of physicians.

The food system was also critical. Berlin could produce only 2 percent of what was necessary. Only the importation of food from the Soviet zone of occupation prevented starvation. The Soviet Union refused to allow Western troops into Berlin for two months following the city's surrender on 7 May 1945. During those eight weeks, Berlin and the Berliners were subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of the Soviet army.

In the confusion of ending the war, negotiating the shape of post-war Europe, and establishing the occupation, Allied planners overlooked a significant detail: no formal agreement guaranteed Western access by surface transportation. Opportunities to negotiate access had presented themselves between 1944 and 1946, but other subjects had taken priority. It was variously assumed that the presence of the Western garrisons guaranteed access; that the West could always get along with the Soviets and thus there was no reason for written guarantees. The lack of a formal agreement enabled the Soviets to claim that the Allies were in Berlin only with the special permission of the Soviet Union, not because of their rights as victors, and that this special permission could be withdrawn.'

[From *The Making of the Modern World* by Christopher Condon]

SOURCE 1B

The source below outlines the reasons why Russia decided to introduce a blockade to prevent access to Berlin in 1948.

The year 1947 saw major shifts in occupation policy in Germany. On 1 January, the United States and United Kingdom unified their respective zones and formed Bizonia, which caused tensions between East and West to escalate (increase). In March, the breakdown of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and the enunciation (declaration) of the Truman Doctrine served to harden the lines of an increasingly bipolar (two-fold) international order. In June, Secretary of State George Marshall announced the European Recovery Program. The purpose of the Marshall Plan – as the program came to be called – was not only to support economic recovery in Western Europe, but also to create a bulwark against Communism by drawing participating states into the United States' economic orbit.

In early 1948, the United States, United Kingdom, and France secretly began to plan the creation of a new German state made up of the Western Allies' occupation zones. In March, when the Soviets discovered these designs, they withdrew from the Allied Control Council, which had met regularly since the end of the war in order to coordinate occupation policy between zones. In June, without informing the Soviets, American and British policymakers introduced the new Deutschmark to Bizonia and West Berlin. The purpose of the currency reform was to wrest (gain) economic control of the city from the Soviets, enable the introduction of Marshall Plan aid, and curb (limit) the city's black market. Soviet authorities responded with similar moves in their zone. Besides issuing their own currency, the Ostmark, the Soviets blocked all major road, rail, and canal links to West Berlin, thus starving it of electricity, as well as a steady supply of essential food and coal.

[From <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/berlin-airlift>. Accessed on 15 April 2022.]

SOURCE 1C

The following source explains how the Allied Powers responded to the Russian blockade of Berlin in 1948.

The Allies had several options to confront the Berlin blockade. They could attempt to open supply routes on the ground, or they could supply Berlin from the air. The first instinct (feeling) of Gen Lucius D. Clay, United States military governor, was to suggest putting an American armoured column on the road to Berlin instantly. The ... USA approved it with the stipulation that the armoured column would not attempt to fight its way through if the Russians stood fast. Clay refused to proceed under those circumstances. In light of the limited ground options, there was no recourse (option) but to supply Berlin by air.

The Allies began in July with the capability to deliver over 2 000 tons per day and completed the operation with the capability to transport 6 000 to 7 000 tons per day. Allied airlifters were required to supply Berlin with not only enough food and supplies for it to survive the blockade but enough food and supplies for it to prosper as a community. Berlin had adequate supplies on hand to last roughly 30 days.

By the beginning of 1949, transport aircraft were operating from eight departure airfields into three arrival airfields. The narrow corridors into and out of Berlin, coupled with limited airspace over the city and finite (fixed) ramp space on the three Berlin airfields, placed a requirement to use each slot with precision. ... General Tunner's continuous flow was based on a three-minute departure interval. This translated into 480 landings in a 24-hour day at each of the three Berlin airfields.

[From <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13825.9>. Accessed on 21 November 2021.]

SOURCE 1D

This photograph taken in 1948, shows an American transport aircraft carrying supplies and about to land at Tempelhof Airport, West Berlin.



[From *The Oxford illustrated History of Modern Europe*, edited by TCW Blanning.]

QUESTION 2: WHY WAS THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALÉ REGARDED AS A TURNING POINT IN THE HISTORY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA?

SOURCE 2A

The following source explains how the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale unfolded in 1987.

In August 1987 Angolan and Cuban brigades (units of soldiers) under a Russian commander began a large-scale attack on UNITA. The South African troops who were rushed to the rescue made use of tanks for the first time since World War II. The fighting that raged (spread) to the north of Mavinga has been called the greatest battle to date in Africa south of the Sahara. The South Africans, supported by UNITA, halted the Angolans' advance on the Lomba River and then drove them back towards Cuito Cuanavale, where the Angolan soldiers dug in and resisted obstinately (stubbornly).

They also began to get increasing support from their air force while the South African air force began to lose air control. The Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) thought that Cuito Cuanavale could be taken, but that it would cost the lives of about 300 white soldiers as well as a great number of black soldiers from the South West African Territorial Force and UNITA. Such a price was regarded as too high and it was decided to leave Cuito Cuanavale in Angolan possession ...

Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point in the history of Southern Africa. The stalemate (deadlock) there led all parties to think again. It was clear to all that victory was not in sight and that to continue the war would lead to continually greater losses. South Africa found it ever more difficult to justify the enormous (huge) cost of the war in Angola, amounting to over R1 million a day. Above all, the lengthening list of young men dying in Angola and the increasing militarisation of South Africa was arousing opposition. At the same time Angola yearned (desired) for peace so that her war-damaged economy, infrastructure and human relations might be repaired.

[From *South Africa in the 20th Century* by BJ Liebenberg and SB Spies (eds.)]

SOURCE 2B

The extract below is taken from a speech delivered by Fidel Castro (leader of Cuba) at a rally that was attended by thousands of people in Havana on 5 December 1988. Castro defended the involvement of Cuban troops in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The Angolan government had assigned us (Cuba) the responsibility of defending Cuito Cuanavale, and all necessary measures were taken not only to stop the South Africans, but to turn Cuito Cuanavale into a trap, a trap the South Africans ran into. In Cuito Cuanavale the South African army really broke their teeth (lost its power) ...

The United States had been meeting with Angola for some time, presenting themselves as mediators (negotiators) between the Angolans and the South Africans to seek a peaceful solution, and so the years went by. But while these supposed negotiations were taking place with the United States as intermediaries (negotiators), the South Africans had intervened and tried to solve the Angolan situation militarily, and perhaps they would have achieved it if it was not for the effort our country (Cuba) made. In fact, the relationship of forces changed radically. The South Africans suffered a crushing defeat in Cuito Cuanavale and the worst part for them was still to come ...

There are moments when difficult and bitter decisions have to be taken, and when that moment came, our party and our armed forces did not hesitate for an instant. I believe that helped to prevent a political calamity (disaster), a military calamity for Angola, for Africa and for all progressive forces. I believe that our actions (at Cuito Cuanavale) decisively boosted the prospects for peace now present in the region.

[From *In Defence of Socialism: Four Speeches on the 30th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution* by F Cast]

SOURCE 2C

The source below is an article written by Ronnie Kasrils, former Deputy Minister of Defence on the impact of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale on Namibia and South Africa.

The central issue was United Nations (UN) Resolution 435 of 1978, demanding an end to South African occupation of Namibia and that country's independence. South African and Cuban military withdrawal from Angola was linked to this. It is history that the last SADF soldier left Angola at the end of August 1988, and that Namibia became independent in March 1990. Apartheid Foreign Minister Pik Botha had tried to modify (change) Resolution 435, asserting that the SADF would withdraw from Angola only "if Russia and its proxies (allies) did the same".


In March 1988, Pretoria was only offering to withdraw into Namibia – not from Namibia – in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication was that South Africa had no real intention of giving up the territory. However, this they did, which was something they had never contemplated (considered) before the final abortive (failed) attempt to take Cuito Cuanavale. This testifies that failure there, followed by the Cuban-Angolan offensive southwards, decisively altered the strategic situation, broke the ascendancy (dominance) of Pretoria's hawks, and led not only to Namibian independence but to the final process of democratic change in South Africa itself.

With such defeat the SADF lost its influence and prestige. I would argue that this contributed to the dramatic shift in approach from the hawkish (aggressive) militarist PW Botha to FW de Klerk. Success of the negotiations between the apartheid regime and the ANC followed, leading to a democratic South Africa. From the 1960s the SADF had served the apartheid regime's strategy of destabilising the so-called Front-Line States. At Cuito Cuanavale, 25 years ago, that came to an end.

[From *South Africa in the 20th Century* by BJ Liebenberg and SB Spies]

SOURCE 2D

The photograph below shows Sam Nujoma and FW de Klerk shaking hands during the independence celebrations of Namibia in March 1990.



[From <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13891138>. Accessed on the 22 February 2022.]

QUESTION 3: WHAT ROLE DID MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. PLAY IN ENDING RACIAL SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE USA, IN THE 1960s?

SOURCE 3A

The following source explains how the Montgomery bus boycotts thrust (put) Martin Luther King Jr. into a leadership position in the Civil Rights Movement in 1955.

As 1955 ended, King found himself in the midst (centre) of the struggle for civil rights in the heart of the South. ... Rosa Parks had just completed a long day's work as a seamstress in a downtown department store. When she boarded the bus, Parks located a seat in the first row of the African American section, only to be ordered to move a few minutes later to accommodate a boarding white passenger. As Parks continued to sit, the bus driver got the police involved, who placed her under arrest. "

Parks' arrest thrust (drove) King into the front lines of a local movement for civil rights. ... He called on his congregation to join a citywide, one-day boycott of city buses. ... Aware of the history of divisions among the city's black community, he called for unity as they worked together for justice. The bus boycott galvanised (united) Montgomery's African American community

Their first transportation alternative was to enlist African American-owned taxis to offer service at a reduced rate equivalent to local bus fares. An intricate (complex) carpooling system was created that allowed residents to get the transportation they needed. Instead of spending their dollars in white-owned businesses downtown, African Americans increasingly depended upon one another, creating new business and job opportunities.

King proclaimed: "Right here in Montgomery, when the history books are written in the future, somebody will have to say, 'There lived a race of black people ... who had the moral courage to stand up for their rights.'"

[From *Becoming King – Martin Luther King Jr. – The making of a national leader* by Troy Jackson]

SOURCE 3B

This source below is an extract from Martin Luther King Jr's letter from Birmingham Jail in which he outlines the reasons for the Civil Rights Movement's march in Birmingham. The letter was written on 16 April 1963.

I cannot sit idly (carelessly) by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. ... Birmingham is probably the most thoroughly segregated city in the United States. Its ugly record of police brutality is known in every section of this country. Its unjust treatment of Negroes in the courts is a notorious reality. There have been more unsolved bombings of Negro homes and churches in Birmingham than in any other city in this nation.

Based on them, Negro leaders sought to negotiate with the city fathers. But the political leaders consistently refused to engage in good-faith negotiation. ... Last September, came the opportunity to talk with leaders of Birmingham's economic community. During the negotiations, certain promises were made by the merchants -- for example, to remove the stores' humiliating racial signs. ... As the weeks and months went by, we realised that we were the victims of a broken promise.

We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, "Wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch (hang) your mothers and fathers at will; when you have seen hate filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; - then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait. ... Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom will eventually come. We will reach the goal of freedom in Birmingham and all over the nation.

[From https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html. Accessed on 15 April 2022.]

SOURCE 3C

This photograph was taken during the March on Washington, which took place on 28 August 1963. It depicts Martin Luther King Jr. and other religious leaders leading a crowd of 200 000 protesters. It was during this march that Martin Luther King delivered his famous, 'I have a dream speech'.



[From <https://jwa.org/media/photograph-of-march-on-washington-featuring-we-march-for-signs-and-civil-rights-movement-leader>. Accessed on 15 April 2022.]

MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.

SOURCE 3D

This source explains the reasons why the Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. embarked on the march from Selma to Montgomery in March 1965.

... More than three of every four potential black voters in Alabama were being denied the basic right to cast their ballots. When Reverend King came to Selma early in 1965, he assured his listeners that, "We will seek to arouse (awaken) the federal government by marching by the thousands [to] the place of registration.' During the following weeks, as blacks marched to the county courthouse to register, they were met with police batons and arrested. King himself was arrested. As in Birmingham, 500 Selma schoolchildren were encouraged to march on the county courthouse after King's arrest.

President Johnson then made a countermove and federalised (placed under federal law) the Alabama National Guard, deploying 1,800 troops to guard the demonstrators on the road to Montgomery. As the marchers moved along Route 80 toward Montgomery, they were greeted with a long and constant stream of detractors and white segregationists who shouted, "Yankee trash go home." Unlike the earlier march from Selma, though, there was no violence. The march lasted five days.

As the marchers approached the outskirts of Montgomery, word circulated of a plot to kill Reverend King. Undaunted by the threat, King would not leave the march to protect his life. King addressed the triumphant crowd. He knew that everyone was tired but proud of their accomplishment. He assured them that their actions were being noted and that their voices were being heard: "I stand before you this afternoon with the conviction that segregation is on its deathbed in Alabama'. On 6 August 1965, President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act. Flanked as he placed his name on the new law were Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks.

[From *The Civil Rights Movement – Striving for Justice* by Tim McNeese]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Becoming King – Martin Luther King Jr. – The making of a national leader

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13825.9>

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/berlin-airlift>

<https://jwa.org/media/photograph-of-march-on-washington-featuring-we-march-for-signs-and-civil-rights-movement-leader>

https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13891138>

In Defence of Socialism: Four Speeches on the 30th Anniversary of the Cuban

South Africa in the 20th Century

The Civil Rights Movement – Striving for Justice

The Making of the Modern World by Christopher Condon

The Oxford illustrated History of Modern Europe